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KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2012-1681 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Lee Brown asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 770 (Ct. App. Nov. 26, 
2013) (hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which reversed the district 
court's order granting Mr. Brown's motion to suppress, was in error because the Court 
of Appeals erroneously determined that the trial court's finding of when the reason for 
the stop was over was a conclusion of law, and further erred in holding that it was 
unsupported by any evidence. Thus the Court erred by holding that it was "unable to 
1 
find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's] conclusion of law that the 
purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Brown's van."1 
(Opinion, p.6.) As a result of these errors, Mr. Brown submits that the Opinion, was in 
conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of 
Appeals. Mr. Brown respectfully submits that, when viewed in context of the trial court's 
entire findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is apparent that the trial court was 
following the proper legal standards and had made a factual finding that was based on 
evidence contained in the record, namely that the officer had testified as to the order of 
his investigation at the hearing-that he first talked to Mr. Brown about the plastic 
covering his rear window, then he requested the driver's license and registration, which 
he then ran through the computer, before returning to Mr. Brown's vehicle to ask 
consent to search. Thus the district court's factual finding that the purpose of the stop 
had concluded after the officer ran the information through the computer was supported 
by substantial evidence in the record, and the Court of Appeals erred both in holding 
that the point at which the purpose of the stop ended was a conclusion of law, and in 
finding that the officer intended to give Mr. Brown an additional warning. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Christopher Brown was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver based upon evidence found during a search of Mr. Brown's vehicle. (R., p.12.) 
The State's charge was the result of a traffic stop that allegedly uncovered a quantity of 
marijuana and various items of drug paraphernalia, including a scale and plastic 
1 Conversely, there was no evidence in the record to support the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the officer returning to 
Mr. Brown's van. 
2 
baggies. (R., pp.11-12.) Thereafter, Mr. Brown moved to suppress the evidence, 
arguing, in part, that he was seized in violation of his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed as fruits of 
his unlawful seizure. (R., pp.38-39.) As additional testimony was deemed necessary 
before a written memorandum in support of Mr. Brown's motion to suppress could 
feasibly be prepared, the district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at 
which Officer Cwik testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure and 
arrest of Mr. Brown. (See generally, 4/30/12 Tr.) After hearing the testimony, the 
district court set a briefing schedule for the parties. (4/30/12 Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.43, 
L.11.) 
In his memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Brown raised two challenges to 
his detention and the search of his vehicle.2 First, Mr. Brown asserted that the officer 
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal wrongdoing at 
the time of the stop. (R., pp.65-68.) Second, Mr. Brown asserted that any consent to 
search, if consent was given at all, was constitutionally invalid. (R., pp.68-71.) The 
district court granted the motion to suppress and made oral findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 3 (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-7; R., pp.74-75.) The relevant findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are as follows: 
1. On January 27, 2012, near midnight, Officer Cwik observed a vehicle in 
the Hastings parking lot, which is in Coeur d'Alene just north of Appleway. 
2 Mr. Brown also raised as an issue whether his cell phone could be searched without a 
warrant; however, the district court did not rule on or otherwise address this issue in its 
oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., p.72.) Respondent reserves the right 
to re-raise this issue in the event that the district court's order suppressing the evidence 
is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court. 
3 The district court announced that its oral pronouncement constituted its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that supported its decision. (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-7.) 
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The officer saw a particular van that was missing its rear window. It had a 
plastic covering over the window. The van was idling, and the officer 
observed that he could not see through the plastic covering in the rear 
window and determined that that was a violation of state traffic laws. 
2. Officer Cwik testified that he watched the vehicle for approximately ten 
minutes and then saw the vehicle leave the parking lot and drive in what 
the officer determined to be a somewhat erratic or eccentric manner. That 
is, the route the vehicle drove when it left the parking lot in a westbound 
fashion than turned north on Government Way. It turned east on Anton, 
which is the very next street up. It turned south on Fourth Street, which 
was the very next street it could come to. It turned west on Appleway 
again. It turned north on Government Way again. Essentially, the vehicle 
went in a circle around the big block, until the officer stopped the vehicle in 
the parking lot of a business off of Government Way. 
3. Officer Cwik testified that he spoke with the driver and obtained the 
driver's license, registration and insurance from Mr. Brown. He ran the 
information regarding the driver of the vehicle through the Coeur d'Alene 
police computer system to find out if there were any wants or warrants out 
for Mr. Brown and to check the status of his driver's license. 
4. Officer Cwik asked Mr. Brown to explain the driving pattern, and 
Mr. Brown explained that he lives on Anton, but was distracted by talking 
to a friend, presumably on the telephone. This was not a very satisfying 
explanation. 
5. Officer Cwik also testified that he had obtained information about 
drugs being sold from a vehicle in that location fitting the description of 
Mr. Brown's vehicle. There was no more specificity provided other than 
that generalized understanding by Officer Cwik. 
6. Based on a review of the videotape, Officer Cwik received an envelope 
from the driver that presumably contained Mr. Brown's registration, license 
and insurance information. The officer then left Mr. Brown still seated in 
the vehicle and returned to his patrol car with the envelope. 
7. After Officer Cwik determined that there were no wants or warrants out 
for Mr. Brown, he asked Mr. Brown if he would consent to a search of his 
vehicle. Mr. Brown consented to the search. Mr. Brown's driver's license 
was not returned to him at the time that he was asked and granted 
consent to search the vehicle. Officer Cwik spoke to Mr. Brown for about 
30 seconds before Mr. Brown exited the vehicle and Officer Cwik began to 
search. 
8. During a search of the vehicle, Officer Cwik found marijuana. 
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9. There was a reasonable basis for Officer Cwik to stop the vehicle. 
There was reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction 
was occurring; specifically being the plastic that was not able to be seen 
through on the rear window-that was the basis for a traffic stop. 
10. The reason for the traffic stop-the covered up rear window-was 
over at the time that the officer returned to contact with Mr. Brown, and 
that the traffic stop was then extended. 
11. Mr. Brown was not free to go. Mr. Brown did not have his driver's 
license in hand or his registration or his insurance, and the traffic stop was 
extended for no articulable reason other than for the officer to ask for 
consent to search the vehicle. 
12. The Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 
647 (Ct. App. 2002) is instructive in that an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop. "An individual may not be detained, even momentarily, without 
reasonable objective grounds for so doing. A consent to search given 
during an illegal detention is tainted by the illegality and therefore is an 
ineffective consent." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
13. Because Officer Cwik kept a hold of the driver's license and 
registration and insurance, beyond what was necessary for dealing with 
the covered up window in the back, such constituted an unlawful and 
illegal extension of Mr. Brown's detention, which rendered ineffective the 
consent Mr. Brown gave to Officer Cwik. 
14. There was no valid consent and anything found in Mr. Brown's vehicle 
would be suppressed. 
15. Based on a review of the video, the consent for search was requested 
and granted without the information being handed back to Mr. Brown-he 
was not free to go and therefore his detention was extended without a 
reasonable basis to do so. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.13, L.8.) 
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The district court found, based on the testimony of the investigating officer and a 
review of the video of the stop,4 that the consent to search was invalid, as the 
investigating officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop of Mr. Brown for no articulable 
reason other than the officer asking Mr. Brown for consent to search his vehicle. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-2, p.10, Ls.16-18.) The district court found that Mr. Brown's 
consent to search was given during an illegally extended detention and was therefore 
tainted by the illegality, rendering it an ineffective consent, and ordered the evidence 
suppressed. (5/24/12 Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.1; R., pp.75, 78.) 
The State appealed. (R., pp.80-82). 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, finding that 
Mr. Brown's consent to search was valid because the stop was not irnperrnissibly 
extended. (Opinion, p.4.) The Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the stop 
continued when the officer asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. (Opinion, p.6.) The 
Court noted that the officer had not returned Mr. Brown's license or registration, had not 
given Mr. Brown the warning regarding the rear window, and the officer reasonably 
wanted to inquire about Brown's driving pattern. (Opinion, p.6.) Thus the Court was 
"unable to find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's] conclusion of 
law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Brown's 
van."5 (Opinion, p.6.) 
4 No audio recording of the traffic stop was available-Officer Cwik was not aware that 
his audio recorder had malfunctioned until the morning of the suppression hearing. 
~4/30/12 Tr., p.24, L.14 - p.25, L.3.) 
However, there was no evidence in the record to support the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the officer returning to 
Mr. Brown's van. 
6 
Stated another way, the Court of Appeals found that the issue of when the stop 
ended was a conclusion of law, and that conclusion of law by the district court was not 
supported by any facts in the record. (Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added).) 
Mr. Brown timely filed a Petition for Review. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court grant Mr. Brown's petition for review, and affirm the district court's 
order granting his motion to suppress, where the district court's findings of fact 
regarding Mr. Brown's suppression motion were amply supported by the record and the 
district court correctly applied the legal standards in granting this motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant Mr. Brown's Petition For Review, And Affirm The District 
Court's Order Granting His Motion To Suppress, Where The District Court's Findings Of 
Fact Regarding Mr. Brown's Suppression Motion Were Amply Supported By The 
Record And The District Court Correctly Applied The Legal Standards In Granting This 
Motion 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Brown submits that the Idaho Court of Appeals incorrectly found that there 
was no evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion as to when the 
reason for the traffic stop ended. Mr. Brown further submits that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the district court's conclusion as to when the reason for the traffic 
stop ended was a conclusion of law. Mr. Brown submits that, rather than speculating 
that, after he asked consent to search, the officer would resume talking to Mr. Brown 
about the plastic covered rear window and eventually issue him a written warning, the 
district court properly evaluated the facts and evidence in the record and found that the 
reason for the stop was over at the time that the officer returned to contact with 
Mr. Brown, and that the traffic stop was then unlawfully extended. To the extent that the 
district court found that the reason for the stop was over at the time the officer returned 
to make contact Mr. Brown, the court's findings were, in essence, based on the totality 
of the facts presented at the suppression hearing, particularly the testimony of the 
officer and the contents of the video of the traffic stop. Because the district court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, when viewed in their totality, were in accord with 
the evidence and with the correct legal standards, Mr. Brown submits that the Court of 
Appeals erred when it reversed the district court. Further, even though the Court of 
Appeals was "unable to find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's] 
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conclusion of law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer 
returning to Brown's van," conversely, there was no evidence in the record to support 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the 
officer returning to Mr. Brown's van. (Opinion, p.6.) 
B. Standard For Granting Petitions For Review 
The decision whether to grant a petition for review of an opinion from the Idaho 
Court of Appeals pursuant to I.AR. 118 is discretionary with this Court. I.AR. 118(b). 
When this Court grants a petition for review, this Court reviews directly the decision of 
the trial court. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,470 (2010). 
C. This Court Should Grant Mr. Brown's Petition For Review, And Affirm The District 
Court's Order Granting Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress The State's Evidence, 
Because the District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress 
The State's Evidence 
As an initial matter, Mr. Brown asserts that this Court should grant his petition for 
review because the Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is probably not in 
accord with prior decisions from this Court and from the Court of Appeals with regard to 
the application of the proper standard of review for decisions by the trial court with 
regard to motions to suppress. See I.AR. 118(b)(2), (3). 
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, this Court defers to the district court's 
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. 
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). This Court also gives deference to any implicit 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. 
Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, this Court reviews de novo the trial 
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court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho at 485-486. At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals examined the evidence in the record and found 
that the officer "had not given Brown the warning regarding the rear window" before 
asking Mr. Brown to exit the vehicle. (Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals went on to 
find that "[t]his Court is unable to find any evidence in the record to support the 
conclusion of law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer 
returning to Brown's van." (Opinion, p.6.) 
However, the point in time where the investigating officer ceased investigating 
the plastic covered rear window is a finding of fact. See e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 
993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that finding that "the period of detention by 
the officers was not beyond the scope of the initial purpose for the stop" was a finding of 
fact that was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous); United 
States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 797 (O.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that finding of fact to 
be determined by the district court included question of whether retention of defendant's 
identification for the purpose of running the information through the computer was 
related to the purpose of the stop). Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
district court's determination of when the purpose of the stop ended was a conclusion of 
law. (Opinion, p.6.) 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but 
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freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). The standard of review upon which a 
reviewing court examines a district court's order on a motion to suppress the State's 
evidence looks to the totality of the court's findings and views all of the trial court's 
findings within this context. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111-112 (2013); 
State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 503-504 (Ct. App. 2000). In addition, appellate courts 
will uphold any implied findings in support of the trial court's ruling where there is any 
gap in the actual findings made by the trial court and where the evidence will support 
those findings. See, e.g., State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 624-627 (1986); State v. 
Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 314-316 (Ct. App. 1993). Under a review of the totality of the trial 
court's order, it appears that the standard used by the Court of Appeals to examine the 
trial court's findings is not supported by Idaho case law. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals improperly disturbed the finding of fact by the trial 
court as to when the purpose of the stop ended, as that finding was supported by 
substantial evidence-the testimony of the investigating officer that he spoke to 
Mr. Brown about the traffic violation before running his documentation through the 
computer. (4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10) (emphasis added). 
Decisions regarding the credibility of the evidence, as well as inferences from the 
evidence, are solely within the province of the trial court. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho 
at 810. Because the district court was empowered to make just such an inference from 
the evidence, there was nothing improper in the district court relying on Officer Cwik's 
testimony in order to find that the purpose of the stop was over after Officer Cwik 
returned to make contact with Mr. Brown after running his information through the 
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computer. At the suppression hearing, Officer Cwik testified as to the timeline of the 
traffic stop: 
Q: And what occurred after you stopped that vehicle? 
A: I spoke with the driver about the traffic violation. I spoke with the driver 
about the traffic violation, and then I went back to my car and I ran his 
information through the MDC. 
(4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10.) Further, Officer Cwik testified that he warned Mr. Brown 
about the violation of the traffic code: 
Q: Okay. Did you issue him a citation for the violation of some traffic code? 
A: I did not. I gave him a warning. 
(4/30/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25.) 
The district court correctly held that the purpose of the traffic stop had ended 
once Officer Cwik returned to Mr. Brown's vehicle and the stop was unlawfully extended 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Further, the burden was on the State to establish 
that the seizure was limited in scope and duration in order to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure under Florida v. Royer. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 
(Ct. App. 2009.). The State did not meet its burden in this case. The district court 
concluded: 
So this Court finds that by Officer Cwik maintaining and hanging onto the 
driver's license and the necessary paperwork, registration and insurance, 
of Mr. Brown beyond that which was necessary for his dealing with the 
covered up window in the back, was an unlawful and illegal extension of 
that detention, which makes ineffective the consent that Mr. Brown gave to 
Officer Cwik. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-22.) 
Here, the Court of Appeals did not limit its review to a finding of whether the trial 
court correctly applied constitutional principles to the facts as found, instead the Court of 
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Appeals made a specific factual finding adverse to the findings by the district court-the 
Court of Appeals found that the officer had not given Mr. Brown a warning regarding the 
rear window; however, this fact was not supported by the evidence in the record. 
In fact, there was an absolute absence of any evidence that Officer Cwik 
intended to issue a written warning or return to the initial reason for the stop at any point 
after he ran Mr. Brown's documents. 
When asked if he issued Mr. Brown a citation for the violation of the traffic code, 
Officer Cwik stated that he "gave him a warning." (4/30/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25.) The 
record is not made clear whether the warning was verbal or written. In its briefing, 
respondent characterized the conversation between Officer Cwik and Mr. Brown as the 
issuance of "a warning" based on the language that Officer Cwik used-that he told, i.e., 
warned, Mr. Brown that the plastic covered rear window was an equipment violation. 
(See Respondent's Brief, p.12.) Officer Cwik did not testify that he made further inquiry 
of Mr. Brown regarding the covered up rear window, nor did he testify that he wrote out 
a written warning, thus it appears that by speaking with Mr. Brown about the traffic 
violation, Officer Cwik verbally warned Mr. Brown about the potential equipment 
violation at the outset of the stop. Further, there is no indication from the record, and 
the district court did not find, that Officer Cwik revisited (or intended to revisit) the issue 
after running Mr. Brown's information through his computer. Even if this discussion did 
not constitute the "warning" anticipated upon by the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, 
there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Officer Cwik intended to issue a 
written warning. Further, the evidence was uncontroverted that the discussion of the 
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plastic covered rear window had ceased by the time Officer Cwik asked Mr. Brown for 
his driver's license and registration. 
Within this appeal, the State raised no challenge to any of the district court's 
factual findings. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as 
found by the district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Brown's motion to 
suppress the State's evidence. Mr. Brown submits that the district court's ruling 
granting his motion to suppress was amply supported both by the evidence and by 
governing case law, and that this Court should therefore affirm the district court. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been 
incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). 
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. In addition, 
even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of reasonableness. Id. This means that the detention must be both 
justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
originally justified the interference in the first place. Id. 
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, 
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, 
or is about to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be 
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able to point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires 
more than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Whether an 
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention. 
Id. Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying 
justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See, 
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an 
investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. While the 
purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop, 
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562-
563. 
Mr. Brown submits that the district court's order granting his motion to suppress 
was based on ample evidence found in the record and followed the correct legal 
standards, and therefore the district court did not err in finding that the reason for the 
stop was over when Officer Cwik returned to Mr. Brown's vehicle after running 
Mr. Brown's license and registration in the computer. 
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In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals likened this case to that of State v. Silva, 134 
Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000), and found, "Like in Silva, the fact that the officer could have 
issued the warning immediately upon returning to Brown's van is not dispositive." 
(Opinion, p.6.) However, testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress was 
clear-the investigating officer testified that he "spoke to" Mr. Brown about the traffic 
violation before obtaining Mr. Brown's information and running it through the computer. 
(4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-9.) He later testified that he gave "a warning" to Mr. Brown. 
(4/30/12 Tr., p.27, L.25.) No evidence or testimony was introduced which indicated that 
the investigating officer continued his investigation into the traffic violation after asking 
Mr. Brown to step out of the vehicle. No evidence or testimony was introduced which 
indicated that the officer intended to speak to Mr. Brown further about the traffic 
violation after asking Mr. Brown to step out of the vehicle, and no evidence was 
introduced which indicated that the officer intended to give Mr. Brown a written warning. 
It appears that the district court impliedly found that the investigating officer 
meant that when he spoke to Mr. Brown about the traffic violation he was "warning" 
Mr. Brown about the traffic violation, and no evidence or testimony or argument was 
made to the contrary. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is erroneous because it is based 
on a presumption by the Court of Appeals-that the investigating officer was planning to 
talk to Mr. Brown again about the plastic over the window and possibly issue him a 
written warning. For the Court of Appeals to reverse the order of the district court based 
on facts which are not in the record, is a clear departure from established precedent and 
the parameters of its standard of review. 
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The district court found the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Gutierrez, 
137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002), instructive in that an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. "An 
individual may not be detained, even momentarily, without reasonable objective 
grounds for so doing. A consent to search given during an illegal detention is tainted by 
the illegality and therefore is an ineffective consent." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983). 
As was found on by the district court, Officer Cwik's actions in this case are 
analogous to those found to have unlawfully extended the traffic stop in Gutierrez. See 
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647. In Gutierrez, the driver was stopped for speeding. The 
officer collected the driver's license and registration and returned to his patrol car. After 
checking the information, the officer returned to the vehicle and had the driver exit the 
vehicle. The officer then issued the driver a warning citation and returned the license 
and registration. Without indicating the driver was free to leave or turning off the 
overhead lights, the officer then asked three questions unrelated to the traffic stop that 
carried an accusatory tenor. These questions took approximately sixty to ninety 
seconds. The officer explained that he continued the investigation because a 
passenger appeared nervous. The officer then requested and received permission to 
search the vehicle. The search led to the discovery of marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia. Id. at 649. 
In holding that the officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals explained that the "original purpose for the detention of [the driver] and his 
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passengers was to issue a warning or citation for speeding and that purpose was 
accomplished when [the officer] issued the warning." Id. at 652. 
Here, the purpose of the stop-to talk to the driver as to the legality of the plastic 
covered rear window-was over after Officer Cwik finished discussing the window with 
Mr. Brown. The stop was permissibly extended to allow Officer Cwik to verify that 
Mr. Brown was a licensed driver and the vehicle was properly registered.6 However, the 
district court correctly found that the purpose of the stop was over at the point when 
Officer Cwik returned to the vehicle. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that the reason for the traffic stop-
the plastic covered rear window-was over at the time that Officer Cwik returned to 
contact with Mr. Brown, and that Officer Cwik then unlawfully extended the duration of 
this stop in order to request consent to search. The district court found that the traffic 
stop was extended for no articulable reason other than for the officer to ask for consent 
to search the vehicle. The district court found that because Officer Cwik kept a hold of 
the driver's license and registration and insurance, beyond what was necessary for 
dealing with the covered up window in the back, such constituted an unlawful and illegal 
extension of Mr. Brown's detention, which rendered ineffective the consent Mr. Brown 
gave to Officer Cwik. The court's order was well-reasoned and was rooted in an 
examination of the totality of the circumstances - including Officer Cwik's testimony 
relating to the purpose of the traffic stop as well as the officer's testimony as to the 
timeline of events during the stop. (5/25/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-10, p.7, Ls.17-24.) This is 
6 This Court has held that once a legitimate traffic stop has occurred, "nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment ... preclude[sJ the officer from routinely asking the motorist to 
exhibit his driver's license, the vehicle registration and an insurance certificate." State v. 
Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 165 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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precisely the examination that is required under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Although the State asserted that further detention of Mr. Brown was justified as 
Officer Cwik had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the investigation, such a 
claim was not argued to the trial court and was raised for the first time on appeal. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10; Appellant's Reply Brief, pp.5-6.) It is well-settled that 
"Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an 
objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that, "an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. In this case, the actions of Officer Cwik, from the time of his 
initial contact with Mr. Brown, objectively demonstrate that the officer extended the stop 
well beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop for the 
plastic covered rear window. Because of this, the district court did not err in granting 
Mr. Brown's motion to dismiss on the basis that his detention was unlawfully extended 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court 
of Appeals because the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that there was no 
evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the purpose of the 
stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Mr. Brown's van. The Court found 
that the purpose of the stop had not been completed when the officer asked Mr. Brown 
to step out of his vehicle. However, this conclusion runs contrary to the trial court's 
finding, and appears to be based on nothing more than mere speculation. There was no 
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testimony or evidence before either the trial court or the Court of Appeals that indicated 
that the investigating officer intended to further "warn" Mr. Brown about his broken 
window after he asked consent to search the vehicle. Mr. Brown respectfully requests 
that this Court grant review and affirm the decision of the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for review and 
affirm the district court's order granting his motion to suppress the evidence. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2014. 
SALLYr. Y .. 
Deputy State Appella~ublic Defender 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of January, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
CHRISTOPHER LEE BROWN 
513 INDIANAAVE 
CEOUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
LANSING L HA YNES 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
J BRADFORD CHAPMAN 
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
SJC/eas 
22 
